Ordinary dynamic action logics deal with states and actions upon states. The actions can be deterministic or non-deterministic, but it is always assumed that the possible results of the actions are clear cut. Talmudic logic deals with actions (usually legally meaningful actions which can change the legal status of an entity) which depend on the future and therefore may be not clear cut at the present and need future clarifications. The clarification is modelled by public announcement which comes at a later time after the action has taken place. The model is further complicated by the need to know what is the status of formulas at a time before the results of the action is clarified, as we do not know at which state we are in. Talmudic logic treats such states much like the quantum superposition of states and when clarification is available we get a collapse onto a pure state. The Talmudic lack of clarity of actions arises from applying an action to entities defined using the future, like the statement of a dying man on his death bed: We present and discuss the Talmudic legal options in Example 1. We ask the reader to accept that our analysis and presentation of these Talmudic options is correct (see our monograph [1] on the subject) and focus our analysis on what kind of logic is required to formalize these options.
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Readers more interested in logic as applied to law are invited to read up to Section 3 of this paper and further consult [1] and [2] .
Readers interested in formal logic and in traditional public announcement logic are invited to continue to read Sections 4 and 5 of our paper and to consider our system as a new variant (hopefully of some merit) of traditional public announcement logic. We note that such a logic has applications not only in formalizing Talmudic reasoning but also to general modern legal reasoning as well. Our strategy is as follows: Our starting point is the Kripke semantics for predicate modal logic K with expanding domains. This semantics has models of the form m = (S, R, m t ), t in S, where S is the set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation on S and for each t in S, m t is a classical model. We require that whenever t Rs holds then the domain D t of m t is a subset of the domain D s of m s .
The traditional way of adding a public announcement feature to such models is to allow for operators of the form [φ] , where φ is a formula of the language, which takes a model m to a model m φ , whose set of possible worlds is S φ = {t ∈ S | t φ}.
Let us isolate the two features we are going to change in this semantics (a) The kind of classical models m t we are going to use is going to be special and the embedding of the domain of m t in the domain of m s (for the case of t Rs holding) is also special. This restricts the class of models of the semantics. (b) While traditional public announcement operators take out points elements of S, the Talmudic public announcement operators take out elements of R. These two operations are not exactly equivalent (see Appendix B.4). (c) Note that the changes in (a) and in (b) above are orthogonal and independent of each other. So once we explain the change (a) for the classical models (which we call Talmudic classical models), we can explain the new Talmudic public announcement logic of change (b) on the propositional level only.
We now motivate the need for above changes via an example.
Example 1 (Presidential elections). Warren Buffet and Bill
Gates give a gift on 27 October 2011 of a total of 50 billion US dollars to the candidate who wins the presidential elections (see Fig. 1 ). They put the money in an account in the Bank of America. We assume for simplicity that there are at this date 3 candidates running and so we can assume that by 6 November 2012 we know who wins. The question arises what is to be done with this donation in the period between 27 October 2011 and 6 November 2012 (see Fig. 2 ). The legal question we ask, under the above circumstances, who has control of the money in the periods between 27 October 2011 and 6 November 2012 and in the period after 6 November 2012? Talmudic scholars in their debates of how to handle the above case and similar cases put forward five different approaches. Some of these approaches can be formalized in traditional linear temporal logics and traditional public announcement logic. Others, however, do require the new semantics with the new (a) and (b) features mentioned above. The following are the five Talmudic approaches:
1. Reject such an action, do not accept the money. The money still belongs to Bill Gates and Warren Buffet. There is no legal way to accept such a condition. 2. The money belongs to all 3 candidates as a block entity, even after the president is known. This means that a partnership is formed on 27 October 2011, involving the three candidates and this partnership owns the money, and this partnership continues even after 6 November 2012. It is irrelevant who becomes president in 6 November 2012. This approach for the case, creates a new entity, the partnership. We are familiar with this in modern life, but there are other examples, which require a quantum superposition of the elements involved. 3. We assume parallel histories from 27 October 2011 to 6 November 2012. We have a parallel history for each candidate, in which history he gets the money on 27 October 2011 and proceeds to win the elections on 6 November 2012. Which history is true will become clear in November 2012. 4. We have 2 until 6 November 2012, and the correct history afterwards This means that the legal partnership of all 3 candidates controls the money from 27 October 2011 until 6 November 2012 and after 6 November 2012, the president among them takes sole ownership of whatever money is left and takes control. 5. Nothing happens in the period 27 October 2011 to 6 November 2012. The money is frozen and cannot be touched.
We have uncertain unclear situation during this period. Once clarified in November 2012, the clarification is effective retrospectively from 27 October 2011.
Let us now have a short discussion:
• First we discuss the difference between 3 and 5.
In 3, one of the candidates gets the money from 27 October 2011. We don't know who he is until 6 November 2012. So, for example, let us say that candidate no 1 donates some of the money to a charity in January 2012. If candidate no 1 becomes president, the donation stands, because it is his history that is true and he was the owner of the money at the time of the donation. It can be taxed for example by the gift laws in force in January 2012. If candidate no 1 does not become president, then in the real history, as clarified on 6 November 2012, he was not the owner of the money and there is no donation. To secure the donation it would be wise to have all candidates approve it. In 5, the candidate who becomes president gets the money on 6 November 2012 retrospectively from 27 October 2011. So let us say that candidate no 1 donates some of the money to a charity in January 2012. Even if candidate no 1 becomes president, the donation does not stand because at the time of the donation, he was not the owner of the money. He became owner retrospectively on 6 November 2012. The candidate can, if he still wants to, donate the money again on 6 November 2012 and then it is taxed for example by the gift laws in force on 6 November 2012. The perceptive reader may ask, in what way is this retrospective ownership different from the straightforward case of ownership beginning on 6 November 2012? Well, suppose the winning candidate divorces his wife on January 2012. The retrospective ownership of the money may count for the divorce settlement. • Second we discuss a chain situation. Suppose one of the candidates is the favourite of the opinion polls. He goes ahead and promises the money to other banks who give credit to other companies and a long chain is created. If the unexpected happens and he is not elected president, then we ask in what state are we left in 6 November 2012? This is not so much a practical problem but a logical problem. In the model we may think we are at one state in one time line and the public announcement tells us we are in a different time line, how do we identify logically in the semantics where we are supposed to be?
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There are two components in this example which call for new logical features:
(i) The second Talmudic approach (item 2 above), requires the creation of new entities. The presidential example requires the creation of a partnership, which is a well known procedure, but other cases may require the creation of a quantum superposition of elements. We now briefly explain. Suppose a man marries one of identical twin sisters and then on his way back from church has an accident and loses his memory. Suppose each of the twin sisters claims she is the wife. There is no way of telling which is which, we have to wait for the man to gain his memory and hopefully clarify. We cannot say for any of the sisters that she is married or not married. The Talmud treats them as a quantum superposition of two entities (using modern terminology). This is not a partnership. You cannot form a partnership to marry a man. We may have other problems, like are each considered married for tax allowance or not, do we give each all the tax allowance or half of it? (ii) The modelling of the clarification details, which require some form of public announcement logic, which may be newly defined or may already be available in the literature.
Section 2 models (i) and Section 3 models (ii).
It is by now clear that we need to construct a special logic to model the Talmudic approaches 2 and 5 of Example 1. The Talmudic logic we are going to construct is comprised of several components, some known to us already and some are new. The Talmudic system is then used to model certain aspects of reasoning in the Talmud.
The fragments of the logics we are going to use to combine and construct our final Talmudic logic system are as follows:
1. Some aspects of modal K action logic. 2. Some aspects of public announcement logic. 3. Some aspects of the logic of time. 4. Some aspects of (quantum-like) superposition and collapse.
We begin by explaining the effects of these components. 2 Imagine a modal S5 logic of the form (S, t), 3 where S is the set of possible worlds and t ∈ S is the actual world. Suppose we perform an action a in the world t which moves us from the world t to the world s where s is the world where the postcondition of the action holds. Schematically we have Fig. 3 .
The model after the action is (S, s). To be specific, consider a model m t with three element domain D = {a, b, c} and a unary predicate λxP (x). 4 Assume that
2 For the convenience of the reader, who might not be familiar with one or more of these components, we are including a short exposition in Appendices A and B. 3 We use the letter "t" for the actual world, even though it is usually reserved for time points. In our intended models (after actions are clarified) time is linear and discrete and time points are the results of the application of linear sequences of actions, and so the worlds are the times. This is done in Definition 14 below. 4 The reader should note that we are dealing with finite domains and therefore the logics involved are propositional, not predicate logics.
The universal quantifier can be rewritten as a conjunction over all elements of the domain and the existential quantifier can be rewritten as a disjunction over all elements of the domain.
So because our work looks like a first-order logic, it makes it easy to express superposition of elements but at the same time since the logic is really propositional, we need not worry about the well known difficulties in the treatment of first-order modal/epistemic/deontic/temporal logics. The action a is to make P hold for exactly one of the elements. So if we describe the action a as execute "∃!xP (x)" then it is non-deterministic and can have three outcomes:
If we must have perfect clarity we must execute one of the options above, i.e.
either execute "P (a)" We are not necessarily saying that the action is non-deterministic and allows for several possible outcomes (with some probability) as they do in Agent Theory and Dynamic Logic. We are thinking that perhaps it wasn't clear exactly what happened or that the action was interrupted or any other reason for us to have to wait until the matter clarifies. So time is always linear to us, the branching occurs because of lack of clarity. When all is clear all the branching will disappear. This is why we use special notation, see Fig. 5 . So we expect a clarification, a public announcement, telling us where we are. Fig. 6 describes the situation all in terms of public announcement. In Fig. 6 , the arrows are schematic, they do not take time. In the Talmud, the models are temporal and the arrows take time. Fig. 7 shows what happens in time in the Talmud.
To make the example real, let us recall our presidential Example 1, for the candidates a, b and c. There is some lack of clarity on 27 October 2011 which clarifies at time 6 November 2012.
In this case our predicate is P (x) = "x is the sole owner of the money".
So the clarification takes time and it is at this point that the temporal aspect comes in. We need to address the following problems:
1. Analyse the nature of the (Talmudic) action which can give rise to the lack of clarity at time 1.
1.1. Identify parameters in the action which cause the lack of clarity. Fig. 7 the possible results of action a on m 0 are m 1 or m 2 or m 3 . These are all classical models. Note that we cannot adopt the view that we are, at time 1, after the execution of the action, either at model m 1 or at model m 2 or at model m 3 . To see this, think of predicate P to mean being infected. So as a result of the action, either a or b or c were infected. At time 2, we would like to 5 Let us be more specific here. Suppose I ask my agent (from Mrs Renton matrimonial services) to go and arrange for my engagement to one of the three candidates {a, b, c}. I leave it to my agent to decide who is most suitable. The interview is scheduled for Monday. In this case one of them is engaged to me on Monday, though I may not know which one it is until the following Friday. Another possible scenario is that I give my agent a ring and ask him to arrange for my engagement to one of {a, b, c} on Monday. The agent gives the ring to all three of them and says he will inform them later which one he chooses. In this case on Monday one of them is engaged but for each one of {a, b, c} we cannot say she is engaged. put all infected people into isolation. Common sense says we need to isolate all three elements {a, b, c}. This action cannot be justified when applied to the situation in each of the models m 1 , m 2 or m 3 . Clearly the result of the lack of clarity puts us in a new model m 4 . The Talmud allows (because of the lack of clarity) additional models which are some sort of (quantum-like) superposition models, 6 which are different from the classical models. So we will have to define some new Talmudic models of our logic. 6 It should be noted that the quantum-like superposition is itself the model here -and not a logicized form of quantum mechanics as attempted in some forms of "quantum logic". For a survey of attempts at conveying the logical form of a quantum-mechanical state (physical, mathematical) or logicize vagueness and fuzziness [5] . The Superposition principle is what makes the Hilbert spaces and their subsets into (quantum mechanically) more than classical [5, p. 207] . Quantum mechanics deals with different sorts of fuzziness, the "sharp kind" -where "events are sharp, while all semantic uncertainties are due to the logical incompleteness of the individual concepts, that correspond to pure states of quantum objects." (such as determination (a) A modal public announcement logic where the identity of the actual world has several options and the public announcement narrows down these options or moves the actual world to a new set of options.
(b) A temporal logic where one can move from time t to time t + 1 by taking an action.
(c) A combination of the two models where the need for public announcement logic arises from lack of clarity in the action at time t which is clarified by public announcement at a future time. (d) A new type of classical Talmudic logic.
We noted already that in the Talmud the lack of clarity in actions comes from using the future to identify the elements to which the action is applied. So we need a Talmudic theory of individual objects. Thus Talmudic law has inherent situations of vagueness and under-determination, emerging from a role a contingent future plays in the very definition of Halakhic states. 7 (e) We need a model of backwards causality, as the future identification of such entities has influence into the past, see [2] .
So our logic will have the above components put together as required by the Talmud.
Summary
The situation in Fig. 6 arises in the Talmud when an action is taken relating to an individual x whose identity is determined at a future time. Therefore
Start with a model t.
2. Action a is performed on the x such that ϕ(x) is true in the future.
3. Therefore action a is not completely clear. We need to wait until the identity of x is revealed in time. The possibilities are s 1 , s 2 , s 3 . 4. This is the clarification we are waiting for. We are, of course, in difficulty in the interim period until the clarification is revealed. We stress again that the action takes place at time t with the intention that its effect takes place immediately at t. The action needs to be clarified so we wait. When clarified, we still want the result of the action to take place at the original time t! 5. The Talmudic debate on such cases involves five approaches, as outlined in Example 1. To model two of these approaches we need new kind of semantics involving quantum like superposition of elements and possibly a new type of public announcement logic.
Introducing Talmudic classical models
We saw in the previous section that there can be a lack of clarity about the result of applying an action to a classical model. We presented schematically this lack of clarity in Fig. 7 .
Classical model theory can handle the fine distinctions required by Fig. 7 .
Our starting model is model m 0 in Fig. 7 and after action a we move to a triple option
Thus we can say that an extended classical model is a set of several classical models, i.e. an S5 modal model. of Hamlet's height - [5, p. 245] and an "unsharp" vagueness where the predicate itself is not well defined (the honor of Brutus). See also [10] for general reading. 7 Within deliberations of the jurisprudential system of Halacha (Talmudic Law), Halakhic State may refer to a state of affairs in a civil, economic (Mamonot) or criminal law (Nefashot). It can also denote an evoked condition of ritual impurity (Tumah) or the status of a sacrificial animal (Korban), agronomical produce with an intermediary status between personal and consecrated property (Trumot U'Maasrot). All of these realms of Halacha and more have a possibility-spectrum within them, and the Halakhic state is normally the result of human action taken, or an evolved physical situation, with a predefined Halakhic meaning attached to them. In short -a Halakhic state denotes the definition, the status of an object, person or occurrence in accordance with Halacha as it pertains to personal, public, secular and religious laws (all falling under different purviews of Halacha, Talmudic Law). A popular term in the modern special school dedicated to Talmudic study, the Yeshiva (the Brisk-Yeshiva style of learning), is Chalut, sometimes pronounced Chalus or Chalos -literally "application", short for "application of a law".
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The Talmud looks at additional options for a model, call it a "Quantum-like" model m Q 4 , where the predicate P is spread over the vector element (a, b, c) . So in this model we have
( * )
We say "Quantum-like" because this possibility is actually identical to the quantum superposition idea. We therefore need to do two things:
1. Increase our stock of basic models; 2. Specify how our old actions apply to the new models of 1.
Let us allow for products of models. Consider a model
The elements of n are vectors (x, y, z), x from m 1 , y ∈ m 2 and z ∈ m 3 . We identify the old elements a, b, c as the diagonal
take the element
.
So, for example, we have
This is an "implementation" of ( * ) above.
9
Note that the product is ordered. a is chosen from m 1 , b from m 2 and c from m 3 , i.e. each x is chosen from the model where P (x) is made true.
We can now replace Fig. 7 by Fig. 8 . 10 We can therefore give the following definition:
Definition 2 (Talmudic classical models).
1. Let m i be a classical models over the same domain D for the same language L. 8 The predicate P is one place, the vector element (a, b, c) is a single element, so we should write
We abuse notation and write
P (a, b, c).
9 This construction is generic. It always works no matter what the actions do or in what language they are defined, because all we need is to add to our model several additional accessible worlds which are the possible results of the action as well as the product of all of these worlds. It may be the case that if all our actions can be described by a first order formulas then we might be able to describe the entire operation in traditional modal logic. For example in the above particular case we may be able to write something like
We need also say that the world where y is has y acting as a superposition of all the x i using the wff ψ(y), and maybe we can say that in first order logic or maybe not. 10 Note that according to Remark 4 below, we shall take m 0 here and not n 0 as in this figure. The two are equivalent. 
An ordinary classical model m over domain D can be canonically embedded in any product m of the form above over D n by the mapping of any a
3. The process can be iterated, since the model m is itself also a classical model, we can assume in the product of item 2 above the factors m i are themselves products m i and form the further product m . Note the "r" is fixed for all models. We define the diagonal embedding of n into n * = k j=1 n j .
Definition 3 (Embedding of Talmudic models). Let n be a classical
1. Each elementā in the domain of n is mapped onto (ā, . . . ,ā) in n * .
We also have n * ϕ(x) iff for each j, n j ϕ( x j ). Then we can take the model n to be the model at z, i.e. m z = def. n.
Clearly we can embed m x into m z as in Definition 3.
Talmudic public announcement models
We recall our plan to define a variant of predicate modal K with public announcement features suitable for modelling the Talmudic examples. The components are first the classical Talmudic models which are to be used as the model in each world and the way they embed into one another, and second the nature of the public announcements which deletes arcs. The former we addressed in the last section, and the latter we are going to address in this section. It is sufficient to treat the propositional case.
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A Talmudic K frame has the form (S, R, P) where 1. S = ∅ is a set of possible worlds. 2. R is a multi-valued accessibility relation of the form xRY x , where Y x = {x 1 , . . . , x n(x) }, reading:
one of x i in Y x is accessible to x but we do not know which one and we await a public announcement clarification. We require that the set Y x = {x 1 , . . . , x n(x) } is unique in its R relation to x. This requirement reduces the relation xRY x to a binary relation R on S. We can define
• xR y iff def. y is an element of the unique Y x such that xRY x and conversely, given a binary relation R on S define • xRY iff Y = {y|xR y}. We say that (S, R) is a tree if for any y in S there is at most one x in S such that y is in Y x and xRY x holds (i.e. xR y holds). We call n(x), for x in S the accessibility branching parameter of x.
3. P is a set of public announcements of the form
reading: I hereby announce that y is the element accessible to x.
The above is a deterministic public announcement, because it chooses exactly one y ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x n(x) }. The public announcement can be non-deterministic if it chooses a subset Y of {x 1 , . . . , x n(x) }. It therefore has the form
If we allow Y to be empty, this means that we announce that x has no accessible points. This corresponds to the announcement that the action at x failed to execute. See Appendix B.4 for the significance of allowing such an announcement. This capability allows us to delete points, not just arcs, because we can delete all access to a point. 4 . For a given α and R, let R α be
5. Lett = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) be a sequence of points in S. We define by induction the notion oft being a legitimate sequence from t 1 to t n . • a necessity operator [N].
• for α = (x, {x 1 , . . . , x n (x)}, Y ) being a public announcement, define the operator [α] . Let [N] be a necessity operator and A a formula.
Define
[N]A holds at x in (S * , R * R ) iff for all y such that xR * R y, we have that A holds at y.
[N] is an ordinary necessity operator on the accessibility relation R = R * R .
[
5. Note that the syntax depends on the particular semantics and contains elements from the semantics. Since a legitimate sequence indicates a possible world where we reach at a certain time after having embarked from our starting point t 1 at time 1, then if the public announcement clarification literally cancels that sequence, we need to know where we are going to be after the announcement! This question still needs still to be addressed. We shall do this in Section 4 leading to Definition 14 and we shall further give full discussion and comparison in Section 5.
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Remark 9. We quickly compare our Talmudic public announcement models frames with the traditional one. See Appendix B and [11, Chapter 4] . A more detailed comparison and discussion is done in Section 5 and Appendix B.4.
1. Traditional public announcement logic operates as follows. We have a modal K model (S, R, t) and we are at node t.
We announce a wff ϕ such that t ϕ. We move to the new model (S ϕ = {s|s ϕ}, R, t). 12 2. Talmudic public announcement logic we have (S, R, t). We announce α and we move to (S, R α , t).
3. In traditional (say predicate model K with increasing domains) public announcement logics the models m t associated with t are classical models. 4. In Talmudic public announcement logic the models n t associated with t are products, as in Definition 2.
Furthermore, the assignment is not arbitrary but respects the geometry of (S, R) the details of what this means was defined in Definitions 3 and 5.
Definition 10.
1. Let (S, R, P) be a deterministic Talmudic K frame. A subset P 0 ⊆ P is said to be consistent if for no α, β ∈ P 0 do we have α = x, {x 1 , . . . , x n }, y and β = x, {x 1 , . . . , x n }, z and y = z.
2. Let P 0 be consistent, then define R P 0 to be
Note that in the above we abuse notation and identify (x, y) with (x, {y}). 3. P is said to be a properly clarifying set 13 iff for every maximal consistent subset P ⊆ P we have that R P is a binary relation, namely we have:
for every x there exists a unique y such that (x, {y}) is in R P .
We now introduce time into our models. Our concept of time is discrete and time ticks discretely as we move from one state to another by executing some action. So Fig. 9 is a classic discrete flow of time.
The problem arises when the actions involve the need for clarification. Then we get Fig. 10 . Note that in Fig. 10 we move from t to s by executing action a. Now because of lack of clarity about action a, we might end up at states s 1 , . . . , s n . We now apply action b. We therefore must apply b to each of the states s 1 , . . . , s n . We thus get 11 The perceptive reader might say maybe we should have defined the relation in item 4 slightly differently, for example as follows: sR * s iff there exists a legitimate sequence from s to s . This means in terms of R that s can be reached from s in the transitive closure of R. This will not help because the public announcement may cancel arcs used to reach s itself. Furthermore when the model is a tree, each node has a unique legitimate sequence leading up to it and we are back to the earlier definition. We would still have a problem.
12 If ϕ is announced and it is not true at t then we do nothing. 13 The notion of properly clarifying set is not technically used in the paper. We have to mention it because our starting point is a linear sequence of events, like the one in Fig. 9 , which because of lack of clarity, becomes branching, like the one in Fig. 10 . We therefore need to define formally, for the sake of conceptual completeness, when a public announcement system restores clarity. . This is a design assumption motivated by the Talmud and not by any technical reason! Also note that our system must tell us how to apply b to cases where the models at state s i are new superposition models.
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Example 11 (How to apply actions to superposition models).
Let us go and take another look at Fig. 8 . Suppose we have another predicate λxP 1 (x), which we want to apply to one of the elements in {a, b, c}. Suppose in the initial model m 0 we have
We can easily apply first say P (a) and then go on and apply say P 1 (b). The result is the model with
Now if the P -application is not clear, then we get the four options of Fig. 8 . We now want to apply the P 1 (b) action. Since we have four optional models n 1 , n 2 , n 3 and n 4 , we will have to say that we apply P 1 (b) to each one of them. What we do in the case of n 1 -n 3 is clear. We apply P 1 (b, b, b This formulation might be sufficient, but now suppose that we have the integrity constraint
Now in this case we cannot apply P 1 (b, b, b) to n 2 . But can we apply it to n 4 ? Does P (a, b, c) ∧ P 1 (b, b, b) violate the integrity constraint? We can say no, (a, b, c) and (b, b, b) are not the same x or we can say that the property P is superimposed also on b in (a, b, c) and therefore we adopt the view that we cannot apply P 1 (b).
The formal approach would have to accept that (a, b, c) and (b, b, b) are not the same x, however further axioms may come into play for some predicates, for example
The Talmud might have additional constraints for some P and P 1 .
14 We can say do not apply P 1 (b). We can also say apply P 1 (b) and retract if the clarification for P chooses P (b).
Example 12 (Talmudic views, Example 1 refined).
We are now ready to revisit the Talmudic opinions about the situation in
Figs. 7 and 8. Think of the action taken at time 1 as legally endowing entity x from among the set {a, b, c} with the legal status λxP (1, x) such as ownership of an account with 50 billion dollars in it. The action was not clear and the available options for clarification are that either P (a) or P (b) or P (c) or the partnership (superposition) of all three elements, which we formalize as P ({a, b, c}) . Denote the respective models for these options as n 1 , . . . , n 4 .
14 For example the constraint might be that one cannot hold public office and be fraudulent at the same time, and also hold the view that if one is involved as a partner in a legally registered partnership which is fraudulent, then one is to be considered fraudulent as well. 
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The simplest story we can give is that we want to confer status P now at time 1 on the x such that x ∈ {a, b, c} and x wins the elections to take place at time m. Obviously we need to wait for time m to clarify the situation. Meanwhile, the following can happen: Obviously from the logical point of view we get lack of clarity 15 because we define at time t = 1 an entity using the Iota ixϕ(x), where ϕ is a predicate dependent on time m.
Formally we have
( ) We have the following Talmudic positions, as we already mentioned in Example 1.
1. We do not accept such definitions. Nothing happens. Reject, i.e., making such a conditional proposition is not logically coherent and carries no sense. 2. We do not accept such definitions but nevertheless something does happen. We move to the quantum model n 4 immediately from time 2, and even at time m if a specific y is found, we still remain with model n 4 .
Of course, if say c dies at time 2 then from time 3 the superposition may be on {a, b} only, but not necessarily. For example if it is not clarified to which of {a, b, c} I am married, then if c dies then I may be considered a widower, so the superposition (a, b, c) still continues. In fact, in legal and every day life elements never die, we still talk about them.
In the UK it is possible for parents to register their unborn child to Beavers (the youngest age group in the Scouting movement) on the expectation of the child's coming existence.
To be quite clear, this position says that even when there is clarity at time m that P (a) should hold, we still stick with the (quantum-like) superposition P (a, b, c). So if at time m + 1 we want to execute P 1 (b), with the constraints
we still reject the action because the superposition on b remains. See Example 11. 3. We do accept such definitions. We think of parallel histories and wait for time m for clarification to find the y (if it exists) and P (y) holds from time 1.
We accept the definition, however the clarification is effective only from time m. At the intermediate times, times 2 to
m − 1, the model is the (quantum-like) superposition model n 4 . Again if c dies the superposition is reduced. Even after time m when we look back and ask what model was at time 2? We will say n 4 . 5. We accept the definition and the clarification is effective from time m. Thus the winner has property P only from time m.
Remark 13 (Methodological comments).
The perceptive reader must have noticed that so far we defined semantic models to help us understand Talmudic reasoning. We gave Kripke type semantics but did not give any corresponding formal syntax. This is not needed in principle. Think for example of Situation semantics, pioneered by Jon Barwise and John Perry in the early 1980s, this was a purely semantic attempt to provide a solid theoretical foundation for reasoning about commonsense and real world situations. No axiom system was necessary. Only a sharpening of concepts using formal semantics of logic. So to explain the various opinions and nuances of the great Rabbis about lack of clarity in action and time the semantics is sufficient, and the various distinctions can be written in English in the metalevel. No need to introduce modal operators and further write the distinctions in the language of the operators and prove a completeness theorem. 15 This problematic feature of future indeterminates has been recognized in classical Aristotelian logic and was treated along the lines of binary truth values that apply to all times [3] . In pp. 140-142 the different explanations for the status of the predicate of a future (and later past) event in Aristotelian logic. 16 Breira (literaly 'determination'/'resolution') is an underdetermined or uniquely future-oriented choice defining a Halakhic (Talmudic legal) state, that differs from a regular condition (Tenai). Breira is chiefly discussed in Trachtate Gittin 25a, 74a concerning divorce law, and Trachtate Eruvin 37b regarding definitions of extended 'personal space' in holidays (allowing for motion beyond the default degrees of freedom). A more involved case appears in Trachtate Beitza 10a, in the context of deciding on a specific fowl for the holiday feast. For a treatment of classic logical attributes of Breira, [8] . Nevertheless, this new Talmudic semantic does inspire new types of logics and we shall present some in Section 4.
Propositional Talmudic public announcement logic TPK
We now introduce propositional public announcement logic based on K inspired (see Remark 13) by the Talmud. We first need to motivate the formal design of the system.
Motivation
Consider a state t at time 1. To have a concrete example, assume John owns a certain book. John performs an action a depending on the future. He gives the book either to Tracy or to Mary, provided that next week, at time 7, a coin is flipped. If it lands heads then the book is Mary's (action a 1 at state s 1 ) and if lands tails, then it is Tracy's (action a 2 at state s 2 ). Now consider another action: b = Tracy writes her name in the book.
Its precondition is that α = Tracy owns the book.
Its postcondition is β = Tracy's name is in the book.
The question is: Can Tracy perform action b at time 2? Well, if at time 7 Tracy wins, then the action b at time 2 is OK, but if not then the precondition of the action is not fulfilled and so b cannot be performed. However, at time 2 we do not know who owns the book. So one of two scenarios can be allowed to happen at time 2:
1. b is not allowed to be executed. 2. b is tolerated, i.e. it can be executed anyway and a risk is taken.
17
Note that no matter what the policy is, it is a symmetrical policy, as Fig. 11 shows, with respect to states {s 1 , s 2 }.
1. Either b cannot be executed, neither at s 1 nor at s 2 ; or 2. b is tolerated both at s 1 and at s 2 .
The important feature of Fig. 11 is that action b = Tracy writes her name on book 17 The Talmud deals with situations like this, where there is a doubt. The Bible requires us to be strict and so we should not tolerate Tracy writing her name on the book. The situation of flipping a coin is not under her control. Suppose for comparison that the book is given to Tracy on condition that at time 7 she cleans her flat, and if she does not do so then the book goes to Mary. Tracy can argue at time 2 that she is in control and at time 7 she will indeed clean her flat. So her action at time 2 of writing her name in the book, may be tolerated. is tolerated even if its precondition does not hold. This is because the states {s 1 , s 2 } are regarded as some sort of superposition single entangled state s 1 × s 2 . So either b can be applied to all of them or to none of them.
The technical importance of this observation can be seen in Fig. 12 . In Fig. 12 Suppose at time 7 we discover that Mary is the owner. This is the public announcement. Suppose that at time 7 we are at node x, because we chose the path (t, a 2 , s 2 , b 2 , r 2 , . . . , x) at our own best guess and risk.
The public announcement says we should have gone to (t, a 1 , s 1 
The number of outcomes m is fixed and depends on b only, and not on s i (t, a i ) . 18 Note that we can use simpler notation. The points in Fig. 12 can be identified by the actions leading to them. Thus we can write
We shall use this notation in Section 4.2. m outcomes for each s i (t, a i ) 
The

Preliminary formal discussion
We now semi-formally motivate and explain our system. Let A be a set of actions. Let s 0 be an initial state. If the actions are all deterministic then we can move from state to state by applying the actions. The following is a simple run: s 0 aa a . . . If at this point there is a public announcement that a is indeed a 1 , then part of the ambiguity is resolved and our options are now s 0 a 1 a j a r .
We are now ready to define the model. We do this in stages. We also allow for α = (s 0 ). 2. Let R 1 be the relation αR 1 β iff β = α * (a j ) for some a ∈ A and j k(a), where * denotes concatenation of sequences.
A model has the form (S,
Let R be the transitive closure of R 1 .
3. We need the notion of a node x is at a distance n from (s 0 ).
• (s 0 ) is at a distance 0 from itself.
• If α is at a distance n from (s 0 ) then α * (a) is at a distance n + 1.
• The distance is actually the time, since we are applying the actions in sequence, one after the other. If the public announcement says b 1 , i.e. j = 1, then it is a confirmation that we are at the right place. The procedure still works. Now suppose we take action e and apply to our current state. Without the public announcement we move to β * (b j ) * γ * (e). However, the public announcement says we should be at α = β * (b 1 ) * γ and so we should move to α * (e) = β * (b 1 ) * γ * (e).
Thus the effect of the public announcement at α is to send us to α * (e) which is β * (b 1 ) * γ * (e).
We draw the function ρ as in Fig. 13 . Ordinary arrows → indicate R and double arrows indicate ρ. The relation ρ between α and α identifies the public announcement uniquely. Note that α and α are at the same distance from (s 0 ).
Actually there is a problem. What if the public announcement says that actually b j was the correct choice? How do we express that? We will have to let ρ take us to β * (b j ). The perceptive reader might ask, why not be consistent and let ρ take us to β * (b 1 ) in all cases and the case where b 1 = b j will sort itself automatically? The problem with that is that we need to identify where we are going to be when we apply the next action e, in our example we need to identify β * (b 1 ) * γ * (e). We are using ρ to help us so we let ρ point to β * (b 1 ) * γ .
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The very next paragraph does public announcement without action symbols, using just accessibility relation, and the problem of identifying where we should be is crucial.
Let us now look at this differently. Assume xρ y. Since (S, R) is a tree, let z be the unique maximal first point below both x and y. Note that if y itself is below x then z is the predecessor of y. Let u be the next point in the direction of x and v the next point in the direction of y. Again note that if y is below x then u = v = y. Then the public announcement at x says that u is clarified and really should be v. Again, if y is below x then the public announcement says that u was the correct choice. We can write the public announcement in the form xρ y and we identify the point z as its target base. Note that whenever xρ y holds and x is at distance n from the root s 0 , then y is at distance n + 1, unless y is below x.
Note that Fig. 14 clarifies a further point. In this figure there is another public announcement namely wρ w . This one says that z should have been z . Note that the public announcements need not come in the same order as the order of the ambiguities. (z, z ) came before (u, v) but was clarified after. This can be a bit problematic because once we go through z we do not pass through z any more. So we had better require that the clarifications come in order. In the notation where points are described by actions as in Fig. 13 , the order is not important and is not confusing because it is the actions that are clarified.
Note also that if we have another public announcement sending say w to an extension of x of x (i.e. w ρx ) then a previous public announcement will be reversed. We can require coherence and stability and not allow such reversals! 5. We have one more point to discuss. Imagine we have had a clarification as in Fig. 14 , where we had xρ y. Take the branch of history from z to x. This is not the real history because we are moving to point y. However this history is real past for anyone living along the path from z to x. To make it real to the reader assume the action taken at z was the marriage of John and Mary using a priest who has been ambiguously ordained. John and Mary continued as a married couple from z up to x when it was announced that the priest was not properly ordained and therefore the marriage is null. So John and Mary move to point y and their history (path z to y) does not include marriage. We must allow them to remember as part of their past also the path z to x.
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Thus when we create a temporal model out of R and ρ, we must take the above into account! 19 The pure minded reader may object to our approach. He will say that we can still identify where to go. Let ρ take us to the point β * (b 1 ), which is the conceptually correct clarification point. We now know two points (a) where we are, namely α = β * (b j ) * γ ; (b) the clarified action α = β * (b 1 ). From the above two items we can identify γ and go to α = β * (b 1 ) * γ . This is true but only because points are identified by sequences of actions. We do not have this luxury in the general case. 20 The perceptive reader, familiar with the key paper of Governatori and Rotolo [7] , might wonder whether this is just a case of revision. It is not. It is a case of backwards causality of [2] . We have compared and discussed the Governatori and Rotolo work in Section 5 of [2] . 
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Formal TPK
In view of the discussion in the previous two subsections, we are now ready to present our Talmudic public announcement logic. 2.5. Let z be any point, then there exists an x, such that zRx and the successors of z are publicly clarified at x. 2.6. Since every z has a unique successor which is publicly clarified at some point, this means that there exists a path
Definition 14 (Deterministic TPK model).
A deterministic TPK model has the form (S,
. .) such that for every 0 i, s i+1 is the uniquely clarified successor of s i . Note that this is why we call the model deterministic.
2.7. Note that if we define, for x in S, the set T x to be {y|xR 1 y} and let R be defined as the set of all pairs (x, T x ),
we get a frame in the sense of Definition 6. We can also define the public announcements correctly from ρ using item 2.4.
3. We now define a temporal relation < on the model. We use the notion of legitimate sequence of worlds 3. 
. , y).
Remark 15 (Axiomatic formulation of TPK).
It may be of interest to the reader to see how we can design syntax and axioms for the deterministic semantics of Definition 14. The models involve the tree relation R 1 and the functional relation ρ. Each one of these would require a modality to control it. To motivate the syntax, let us give an illustrative figure, Fig. 15 . 21 1. There may be no z such that xρ z.
2. This condition is for deterministic actions only, otherwise ρ is just a binary relation. In this figure, we start at state s 0 and apply action a. Action a is not clear. It either takes us to state t 1 or to state r 1 . We then apply more clear-cut actions b, which takes us to w 2 from t 1 and to u 2 from r 1 and then action c which takes us from w 2 to w 3 and from u 2 to u 3 .
At time 1, we can either be at t 1 or at r 1 . At time 3 we can either be at w 3 or at u 3 . Suppose at time 2 the nature of action a is clarified (publicly announced). It is clarified that t 1 is the correct successor. If we are at u 2 then we should be at w 2 . This is indicated by the double arrow (ρ relation u 2 w 2 ). If we are at w 2 , then we are at the correct place. This is indicated by the double arrows w 2 t 1 . We now have several legitimate sequences of states: We need connectives in the syntax that will give us complete control to describe the properties of the semantics and axiomatize it.
The following is a possible choice. I think we have enough operators in the syntax to describe the semantics. We can write axioms and attempt to prove completeness.
It is not our purpose in this paper to put forward pure technical results, but we are giving enough details for the interested reader.
Example 16. In Fig. 14 we have z < x < w.
Remark 17. To obtain a non-deterministic model we allow ρ in Definition 14 to be a general binary relation. To explain how this works consider Fig. 16 . The points y 1 , y 2 and x are at distance m from t and they are all on different paths separating at z. The points x and y 3 are also at distance m but they are on paths separating at t. So the path s 0 , . . . , z, . . . , u, . . . , t, s, . . . , x made a choice of u over v 1 and v 2 and s over r.
If we let xρ y 3 we are saying r is a correct non-deterministic choice and if we let xρ y 1 ∧ xρ y 2 we are saying that v 1 and v 2 are the right non-deterministic choice.
Note that by saying xρ y 3 we are also implying that u is a correct non-deterministic choice, because only through u can we get to r.
However, we can also take the view that xρ y 3 says that only as long as we can go through u, then r is the correct choice.
Discussion and comparison with traditional public announcement logic
Remark 18. We begin by comparing Definitions 6 and 7 and Remark 8 with Definition 14.
Consider the following Fig. 17 . Ignore the double arrows, and consider only single arrows. The arrows represent the relation R 1 for the set of nodes S.
Define the relation R (according to Definition 6) as follows:
We used the obvious recipe
Consider the following public announcements in the sense of Definition 6:
We now have a model frame in the sense of Definition 6. To turn this into a proper model we need to say what are the worlds and which worlds we assign to atoms. Let us do that. The worlds are the legitimate sequences, which are really the points in the graph, because the graph is a tree. This is in full agreement with Definition 7. Now assume we live at the world s 1 .
Our public announcements establish that the real sequence is (t, z 1 , y, w y , s 2 y , x y. These double arrows, when read according to Definition 14, all express the public announcement (a 1 ), but they also say more than that, they also say where s 1 , s 2 and x are supposed to go to, in the event that public announcement (a 1 ) is put forward! There are provisions in Definition 14 (items 2.3 and 2.4) which ensure that this extra information does not contradict itself.
Furthermore, the double arrows also tell us at what time and place the public announcement is made. So the possible additional double arrow s w for example (which is not shown in Fig. 17 ) not only tells us the public announcement (a 1 ) and where w is to go to (to w ) but it also tells us that (a 1 ) was announced at time 4 (4 is the distance of w from the origin t).
Remark 19. We now compare in more detail the Talmudic public announcement logic with the traditional public announcement logic as described in [11] .
Assume we have modal operators [ϕ] for ϕ a wff and [α] for α a non-deterministic public announcement statement in the sense of Definition 6. We have, in a model (S, R, t).
For comparison we have according to Definition 6.
•
Both definitions move from a larger model (S, R) to a smaller model either made smaller by ϕ or by α.
So if we require that the Kripke frame (S, R) is a tree (every point y in S has a unique predecessor x such that xR y) and allow for any subset T ⊆ S to be definable by a formula ϕ, the two definitions are essentially the same otherwise they are not, see Appendix B.4 for exact results.
In both cases the public announcement is metalevel and outside the model and we require that the point of evaluation t is not destroyed by the public announcement.
The refinement of Definition 14 is different 1. It is object level. 2. It ties the announcement to a time and place. 3. It allows for the evaluation world to be destroyed by the announcement and displaces us and sends us to another world.
4. It has a backward effect in that it allows us to define < as in Definition 14, item 3. We call such models m = (R, R, Ω) time action models. We regard Ω as the initial state, the elements of R as actions a ∈ R moving us from any state t to a new state ta. Such a view is consistent with agent theory, if we regard as part of any state also the sequence of actions generating this state. Fig. 18 shows a time action model. Time comes into the model if we take the view that time moves one unit when we perform any action.
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So at time 0 we are at the initial state Ω.
If at time n we are at the state t and we apply action a then we move to time (n + 1) and to state ta.
Note the following (a) Actions a are deterministic and uniquely take a state t to the unique state ta.
(b) The meaning of t A is that at state t any action a when applied will take us to a new state ta in which A holds. (c) To do proper justice to this view, we need to specify the actions through their preconditions and postconditions and present Ω as a complete theory Ω defining the initial state. When we apply any action a to state Ω, we need a revision operator * taking us from Ω to the theory of the new state Ωa . Let (α a , β a ) be the precondition and postcondition respectively of the action a. Then we have
The upshot of the above is that technically an assignment h into the model which is arbitrary in the traditional case of modal K corresponds to assigning Ω , (α a , β a ), and * to the time action system. Of course we can always take a tree model for traditional modal K and take the successor functions r n and pretend they are actions and pretend that some * exists such that for each t, Θ tr n = Θ t * β r n where Θ t = {ϕ|ϕ does not contain and t ϕ}.
If we do this we need the extra coherence condition that
which means in terms of the assignment h:
• for all atoms q(t q ⇔ s q) ⇒ for all atoms q(tr n q ⇔ sr n q).
The reader can read more about modal logic in [4] and generally about time action logic in [6] .
t J A iff f(t) A.
A well known jump operator in temporal logic is Tomorrow A.
) be a family of models for i ∈ I . We can define a fibring jump operator through a function g :
In this statement we write t i A to mean satisfaction in modal m i .
The function g can be more general. We can assume T i are all pairwise disjoint. So when we write t A, for T ∈ i T i then there is a unique i such that t ∈ T i , and so we know to evaluate t A as t i A.
It is important to adopt the convenient point of view towards the operator J . We start with a model m and whenever we apply J A at a point t, we move to a new model m f(t) . Thus the operator J moves us from one model to another.
B.2. Traditional public announcement logic
Such logics involve operators of the form J ϕ , ϕ a wff, basically declaring publicly that ϕ is true. This is done in the context of interacting agents with knowledge operators and the public announcements are made by the agents to contribute to common knowledge.
Let A be a set of agents and for each a ∈ A; let K a be a knowledge operator. This is a K modality satisfying the following additional axioms:
For a detailed example involving the famous muddy children, see [9] .
We start with an initial Kripke model for {K a |a ∈ A} of the form m = (S, R a , h), a ∈ A where S is the set of possible world and R a are relations R a ⊆ S × S satisfying the suitable conditions for K a axioms. When we use the public announcement jump operator J ϕ , ϕ a wff, we move to a model m ϕ
We have the condition If ϕ is announced as true, we need consider only worlds in which ϕ holds. So we move from one model to another as more and more information is announced.
B.3. Public announcement logic for time-action modal K
How do we introduce the public announcement operators J ϕ A into our modal logic K, where we have the interpretation of time-action for the nodes t = Ωa 1 , . . . , a n ?
We can start by adopting a technical approach, but this will not work. Let us see why. Start with a time action model
Let ϕ be any wff. Let T ϕ = {t ∈ T |t ϕ}.
We can first try to define the semantical condition for the operator J ϕ A, as follows. Assume t = Ωa 1 , . . . , a n . Define t 0 = Ω, t i+1 = t i a i+1 for 0 i n − 1. This makes t = t n .
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( 1)
The reasons for trying to use condition ( 1) and not ( ) is as follows. We start with state Ω and apply actions a 1 and a 2 to get to t = Ωa 1 a 2 . If there is public announcement J ϕ and Ωa 1 ¬ϕ, then even though we may have that Ωa 1 a 2 ϕ, we could not have legitimately reached ta 1 a 2 in the first place. So our condition ( 1) is really conceptually the same as the traditional one ( ) given our time-action interpretation of modal K.
This attempt is not satisfactory. It is not fully compatible with the idea that a public announcement gives us more information about the model and because of that information we get a smaller model. Our time action model is generated from the initial state Ω (whose theory is Ω ) via actions of the form a = (α a , β a ) and a revision process * .
The information that ϕ must be true must be in tune with the way the model is generated and therefore must affect the initial Ω , say we have ϕ Ω = Ω * ϕ and must affect all subsequent action sequences, say recursively
This is one possible way of doing it. However, the Talmud is concerned with a different type of the need for public announcement. In the Talmud, we address lack of clarity in the action a itself. Let x be an action variable where
So we apply action x at t but we don't know whether we applied e 1 or e 2 , . . . , or e k .
Thus after a sequence of further actions, say b 1 , . . . , b m , we might be at any of the following k possible points, denoted by s(x) = txb 1 , . . . , b m .
A public announcement will have the form, say J x=e 1 announcing at a later time that the action x taken in the past was
How such situations can arise and how to handle them is what is discussed in this paper.
B.4. Comparing arc deletion with point deletion
This appendix compares formally the traditional public announcement logic and the Talmudic one. The comparison will be on two levels:
1. The Technical level; comparing expressive power. 2. The conceptual level; our view of what we are doing.
B.4.1. Technical comparison
Basically we will be comparing deleting points from a Kripke model with deleting arcs.
Consider the Kripke model of Fig. 19 We turn (S, R) into a temporal model if we choose a starting point and start moving along the arcs.
Start at point t at time 1. We imagine we take action a because of lack of clarity we don't know whether action a takes us to t or to s. Taking us to s means action a worked. Taking us to t (remaining at t) means action a did not work.
Similarly action a can be applied at s. Understand action a as saying:
leave this world Fig. 19 shows where we can be as time ticks on.
We now check what options we have for public announcement.
B.4.1.1. The traditional case
Assume we are at t. Since t q, the public announcement [¬q] will have no effect and [q] will delete point s from the model and we are left with S [q] = {t} and R [q] = {(t, t)}. See Fig. 21 .
B.4.1.2. The Talmudic case
Again assume we are at t. The public announcements in this case can take out any combination of arcs, one from each node. We get the models of of Fig. 23 Talmudic public announcement cannot disconnect/delete the arrow t → s, but traditional public announcement can delete s by announcing [q].
If we allow the announcement of deletion of any number of arcs, including the possibility of deleting all arcs emanating from a point (which says that the action did not take place at all), then arc deletion is stronger than point deletion, because we can achieve point deletion by using arc deletion. We can delete all arcs leading to a world and thus effectively delete the world.
Remark 20. Talmudic deletion of arcs can be simulated in traditional public announcement logic if we add auxiliary worlds and have nominals. Let us illustrate the procedure by doing it to the frame of Fig. 19. Consider Fig. 24 .
The procedure goes as follows: Given a K Kripke frame (S, R) for the modality [N], let S R be a set of new points of the form S R = {x ts |(t, s) ∈ R}.
Define R 0 to be R 0 = R ∪ {(t, To simulate arc deletion, we need nominals.
Let n ts for (t, s) ∈ R be a nominal for the point x t,s ∈ S 0 . Let n R be a nominal for S R . We thus have y n ts iff y = x ts y n R iff y ∈ S R Given a model (S, R) we can now simulate public announcement for arcs and nodes in (S, R) using (S 0 , R 0 ) as follows To see how this works, let us delete the arc t → s in Fig. 19 . We get the frame of item 1 of Fig. 22 It is clear that if we apply the traditional public announcement [¬n ts ] to Fig. 24 we get as a result the frame of Fig. 25 .
B.4.2. Conceptual comparison
Conceptually the Talmudic view is different from the traditional view of public announcement logic. To highlight the differences, let us do traditional public announcement logic (deleting points) from a Talmudic point of view. Consider Fig. 26 .
Assume we are at point s and we announce publicly [q] .
According to traditional public announcement logic, we cannot proceed, because where we are is the world s, and we have s ¬q. However, if we adopt a Talmudic point of view, we can proceed. The Talmudic view would delete point s by deleting the arc t → s and move to point r, the new world to be at. able to conceptually be compatible with the Talmudic one, its models must have the capability of deleting the evaluation point and moving to a new point. So we must have an additional function f such that the following two conditions hold 1. for each x ∈ S and each E ⊆ S, f(x, E) ∈ S 2. if x ∈ E then f(x, E) = x and if x / ∈ E then f(x, E) ∈ E. Thus f(x, ∅) is not defined! So our models have the form (S, R, h), where h is an assignment to the atoms and f is as above. Let ϕ be a formula which is true at some world in S. Then we define the pubic announcement truth condition to be as follows:
where S ϕ = {y ∈ S| y ϕ}.
Note that f S ϕ gives values in S ϕ , because for any E ⊆ S ϕ and y ∈ S ϕ , f(x, E) is either y (if y ∈ E) or some z ∈ E. In either case f(x, E) ∈ S ϕ . Remark 21. This view can be promising because of its connection with the conditional. Consider the conditional ϕ ⇒ A. Take the traditional reading for t ϕ ⇒ A. This holds if A holds in the most similar worlds to t, where ϕ is true. So if t ϕ, then we want that t A. If t ¬ϕ, then we want A to hold in the best similar world to t in which ϕ holds. But we can now understand the function f(t, S ϕ ) as giving us the most similar world to t from among the worlds in which ϕ holds.
So there is a resemblance to conditionals. We have for conditionals:
and in comparison, we have for our public announcement the similar condition:
As you can see, the definitions are very similar.
